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contrast is the double jeopardy clause itself with its protections
against multiple prosecutions. Scott has the effect of substantially narrowing the scope of such double jeopardy protections,
shifting this scope more closely to the position of English law.
LARRY L. SHUPE

INSURANCE-Subrogation-Accident and Health Insurance Policy Still Characterized as "Investment" Contract.
Rixmann v. Somerset Public Schools, 83 Wis. 2d 571, 266
N.W.2d 326 (1978). In the recent decision of Rixmann v. Somerset Public Schools' the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempted to eliminate some of the confusion that has surrounded the subrogation and collateral source rules in Wisconsin ever since the Delphic case of Heifetz v. Johnson.2 The
Rixmann decision purports to establish simple rules for the
treatment of payments under accident and health insurance
policies in personal injury cases. It is submitted, however, that
the decision's continued characterization of such insurance
policies as "investment" contracts, for which there is no automatic subrogation, does not reflect changes that have taken
place since the issue was originally decided.
The plaintiffs, Ronald Rixmann and his father, brought an
action for damages from injuries Ronald suffered while participating in a high school chemistry class experiment. They had
been reimbursed for all but $656.33 of Ronald's medical expenses by his father's health insurer, Guardian Life Insurance
Company. However, Guardian Life had executed a document
purporting to assign any interest it had from payments under
the policy back to the plaintiffs.
The trial court had ruled that Guardian Life was not subrogated as a result of its payments and, therefore, had no interest
to assign to the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the trial court had held
that the plaintiffs could not recover expenses for which they
had been reimbursed.' Both rulings were contested on appeal.
With respect to the first ruling, the plaintiffs argued that
1. 83 Wis. 2d 571, 266 N.W.2d 326 (1978).
2. 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
3. 83 Wis. 2d at 574, 266 N.W.2d at 328.
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language in Heifetz broadly defining the scope of the subrogation doctrine should apply in this case. Consequently, Guardian Life was subrogated by operation of law to the plaintiff's
right to recover for the medical bills it paid, and its written
4
assignment operated to reinvest those rights in the plaintiffs.
The defendants contended that the language in Heifetz should
be limited to the facts of that case. They argued that the instant fact situation should be governed by Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light,5 which held that payments
under accident and health policies do not result in subrogation
in the absence of an express subrogation clause.
The plaintiffs further argued that the trial court's second
ruling reducing recovery by the amount of the insurance payments was in error because the collateral source rule, which
does not allow certain "collateral" payments to reduce a tortfeasor's liability,' applied. 7 The defendants countered that "if
the court has not in fact done so already, the collateral source
rule should be expressly abolished on this appeal." 8

I. THE

DIsTNC'rION
Traditionally, whether subrogation applies to particular
insurance payments has turned on whether the policy involved
was characterized as an "indemnity" or an "investment" contract. 9 In Gatzweiler, the Wisconsin court defined "indemnity"
contracts as those under which the insured has a right to be
compensated for a definitely ascertainable pecuniary loss.10
Fire insurance policies, for example, have long been characterized as "indemnity" contracts in Wisconsin."
Under an "indemnity" contract an injured insured can seek,
his remedy against either the party causing the loss or his insurer. The insurer stands as a surety for the loss caused by the
principal obligor, the tortfeasor. Thus when the insurer pays its
insured, it becomes subrogated by operation of law to the claim
of the insured, just as a surety who pays the debt of the princi"INVESTMENT-INDEMNITY"

4. Id. at 576, 266 N.W.2d at 329.
5. 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
6. See 22 AM. Jut. 2d Damages § 206 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS §
920A(2) (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
7. 83 Wis. 2d at 574, 266 N.W.2d at 328.

8.Id. at 576, 266 N.W.2d at 329.
9. See, e.g., Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 374, 214 N.W. 374, 376 (1927);

Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light, 136 Wis. 34, 37, 116 N.W. 633, 634 (1908).
10. 136 Wis. at 38, 116 N.W. at 634.
11. Id. at 36, 116 N.W. at 633.
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pal debtor becomes
subrogated by operation of law to the credi12
tor's claim.

In contrast, "investment" contracts merely provide that the
insurer will pay a specified sum to the insured upon the happening of a specified event. Life insurance policies are typical
"investment" contracts. 3 The Gatzweiler court stressed that
under these contracts, the amount payable is a fixed sum and
"has no necessary relation to damages actually suffered by the
beneficiary."'" The court also noted that the loss suffered is
usually not a "definitely ascertainable pecuniary loss"
"determinable by any definite rule for computing the money
equivalent for the damages."' 5 Consequently, the insurance
company in that case was not subrogated to any of the plaintiff's rights to recover. 6
The insurance policy in Gatzweiler was an accident and
health policy. Unlike many modem accident and health policies, however, it merely guaranteed to pay a fixed sum whenever the plaintiff sustained particular specified injuries, 7 such
as the loss of an eye or a limb. Since the amount payable bore
no relation to the plaintiff's actual loss, the court held the
policy to be an "investment" contract. Thus, no subrogation
rights arose in favor of the insurer in the absence of an express
subrogation clause. 8
It is clear that the Gatzweiler court classified the accident
and health policy before it as an "investment" contract chiefly
because of the absence of any relation between payments made
and loss sustained. Following the letter of the Gatzweiler holding, the Wisconsin court has consistently treated accident and
health insurance policies generically as "investment" contracts. This Wisconsin approach is by no means unique,2 0 and
12. Id.
13. Id. at 37, 116 N.W. at 634.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 38, 116 N.W. at 634.
16. Id. at 39, 116 N.W. at 634.
17. Id. at 37, 116 N.W. at 634.
18. Id. at 39, 116 N.W. at 634. This case has been cited for the proposition that
accident and health insurance policies are to be classified as "investment" contracts
because of their resemblance to life insurance policies. Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. Rav. 841, 846 n.19, 856 n.57 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Kimball & Davis].
19. See, e.g., Pattitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932); Campbell
v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927). In Campbell the court classified the
policy as an "investment" contract although it noted that the insured had "the right
to have indemnity" under the policy. Id. at 375, 214 N.W. at 376.
20. See, e.g., Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638
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continues despite the fact that many modern accident and
health insurance policies differ significantly from the policy
with which the Gatzweilercourt was faced. Many of these policies simply reimburse the insured for actual hospital, medical
and doctors' bills. Under such policies the payments made are
determined by the loss sustained, rather than being set in advance as in the Gatzweiler policy. Thus, the policies operate to
"indemnify" the insured. 21 Therefore, they more closely approximate fire insurance policies, which have traditionally
been classified as "indemnity" contracts, than life insurance
policies, with which the courts have continued to classify them
for subrogation purposes.2 2
Some accident and health policies issued today still resemble the Gatzweiler policy, which provided for the payment of a
fixed amount to the insured upon the loss of a leg, an arm or
some other bodily member or function. These policies should
continue to be classified as "investment" contracts since the
payment made is not determined by the loss sustained. However, courts should look to the nature of the particular contract
involved in each case. This is preferable to the present method
of treating entire lines of insurance policies generically, regardless of significant differences between various types of policies
within each line.2I
I1.

SUBROGATION AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE

The collateral source rule is a court established rule that
benefits received by a plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer will not diminish the
damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer. 2 In addition to insurance benefits, the collateral source rule has also
been applied in Wisconsin to salary continuation by an employer during an employee's disability, 21 to the payment of
(1954). The dissent in that case, however, urged that all insurance policies indemnifying the insured in fact should be treated as "indemnity" contracts, regardless of their
generic classification. See generally Kimball & Davis, supra note 18, at 857 n.58.
21. See Kimball & Davis, supra note 18, at 859-60. See also R. HORN, SUBROGATION
IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 220-22 (1964).
22. Kimball & Davis, supra note 18, at 856-57. See also Fleming, The Collateral
Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALiF. L. Rav. 1478, 1502 n.88 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Fleming].
23. Kimball & Davis, supra note 18, at 853-54.
24. See 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 206 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
920A(2) (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
25. Cunnien v. Superior Iron Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921).
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medical expenses by a beneficial society" or by the federal
government and to medical services gratuitously provided by
the state.28
A major criticism of the rule is that in many instances it
allows for double recovery by plaintiffs. 29 Where an insurer is
subrogated to the rights of a plaintiff, however, this problem
is eliminated. To be sure, the tortfeasor's liability is not reduced by the insurer's payments,"0 but it is the insurer, not the
3
plaintiff, who recovers the payments from the tortfeasor. '
One of the major justifications advanced for the collateral
source rule is that plaintiffs should not be denied the benefit
of contracts for which they have paid.3 2 A prudent investment
by the plaintiff should not inure to the tortfeasor's benefit. This
argument is obviously inapplicable to benefits which are gratuitously conferred.3 3 Even in the context of insurance payments the argument has its greatest force in the case of
"investment" contracts where the insured receives no more
than what he expected-a fixed sum to be paid upon the occurrence of a specified contingency. However, this argument is
less persuasive in the case of "indemnity" contracts, such as
modem accident policies where it is more likely that the insured intends "to hedge himself against loss rather than to
gamble for a windfall." 4 The operation of the doctrine of subrogation obviates this problem of unexpected double recovery
26. Cf. McLaughlin v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 31 Wis. 2d 378, 143 N.W.2d
32 (1966) (medical expenses paid by a priest's religious order held recoverable).
27. Merz v. Old Repub. Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 47, 191 N.W.2d 876 (1971).
28. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Trans. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d
745 (1972).
29. See, e.g., Bell, Complete Eliminationof the Collateral Source Rule - A Partial
Answer to Criticisinsof the Present Injury Reparations System, 14 N.H.B.J. 20 (19721973).
30. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 22, at 1498.
31. If the insurer fails to press its subrogation claim, the tortfeasor may be entirely
relieved of the effects of the collateral source rule. See, e.g., Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis.
2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973) (where the insurer's subrogation claim was barred by
the statute of limitations).
32. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 584-85 (1973) [hereinafter

cited as DOBBSi; Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The CollateralSource Rule,
77 HAxv. L. REv. 741, 750-51 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note].
33. The argument for the application of the collateral source rule to gratuitously
conferred benefits is that the donor intended to benefit the plaintiff, not the tortfeasor.
The counterargument is that in all probability the donor intended merely to relieve
the plaintiff's hardship in time of need. There was no intention to provide a windfall
for anyone. See DOBBS, supra note 32, at 585; Note, supra note 32, at 751-52.
34. Fleming, supra note 22, at 1500; Note, supra note 32, at 751-52.
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under most "indemnity" contracts. However, as explained earlier, this is not true of all insurance policies which "indemnify"
3
the insured. 1
In Heifetz v. Johnson36 the Wisconsin court appeared to be
expanding the doctrine of subrogation to cover all insurance
payments, thereby obliterating the "investment/indemnity"
distinction and eliminating the double recovery problem entirely. It stated that, "Acceptance of payment from an insurer
operates as an assignment of the claim to that extent whether
or not the policy contains a subrogation agreement. The plaintiff loses his right to sue for any amount received from his
'3
insurer.
The Rixmann court, however, reaffirmed the Gatzweiler
line of decisions and the traditional "indemnity/investment"
contract distinction.3 8 Furthermore, it followed the specific
holding in Gatzweiler and classified the accident and health
policy under which the plaintiff was paid as an "investment"
contract, even though it was a modem policy compensating the
plaintiff only for definitely ascertainable medical expenses.
39
Consequently, the insurer had no right to subrogation.
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the
collateral source rule should be abolished. The court countered
the traditional argument that the collateral source rule results
in double recovery by saying the injured party's insurance
should not inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor. 0 As pointed
out earlier, however, this traditional counterargument is only
applicable to true "investment" contracts."
The court also noted that, " '[T]he recovery has a penal
effect on a tort-feasor.' "42 This raises another argument which
has often been raised in favor of the collateral source rule,
namely that the rule serves to punish wrongdoers 3 It is in
conflict, however, with the rule that the negligent tortfeasor is
not subject to liability for punitive damages, but only for actual
35. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
36. 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
37. Id. at 124, 211 N.W.2d at 841 (footnote omitted).
38. 83 Wis. 2d at 579, 266 N.W.2d at 330.
39. Id. at 582, 266 N.W.2d at 331-32.
40. Id. at 581-82, 266 N.W.2d at 331-32.
41. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
42. 83 Wis. 2d at 580, 266 N.W.2d at 331 (quoting Thoreson v. Milwaukee &
Suburban Trans. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 243, 201 N.W.2d 745, 752 (1972)).
43. See DoBas, supra note 32, at 586-87; Note, supra note 32, at 748-49.
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damages suffered by the plaintiff because of his actions.4 To
the extent that the tortfeasor is liable for damages for which
the plaintiff has already been compensated, an element of punishment is injected into the law of damages for mere negligence. "
Im.

CONCLUSION

In several respects the Rixmann decision merely reaffirms
prior law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court made it clear that it
will continue to distinguish between "indemnity" and
"investment" contracts of insurance. Only under "indemnity"
contracts will an insurer be automatically subrogated to the
plaintiffs right to recover the amount of insurance payments.
In the absence of a policy provision to the contrary, payments
under "investment" policies will not give an insurer such
rights. Where subrogation does not occur, the collateral source
rule will still apply, giving rise to the possibility of double
recovery.
Unfortunately, the decision also made it clear that the Wisconsin Supreme Court will continue to classify all accident and
health insurance policies as "investment" contracts. Instead of
examining the terms of the various types of policies to determine whether they are investments or truly indemnify the insured, the court will simply continue to call all such policies
"investment" contracts because it did so in Gatzweiler over
seventy years ago. The court's failure to classify modem accident and health policies as "indemnity" contracts, even though
they indemnify insureds for definitely ascertainable losses, will
mean that the doctrine of subrogation will not be applied to
situations entirely analogous to others where it has been applied for years. Consequently, the collateral source rule will
have the effect of allowing double recovery in such situations
where the insured neither expects nor requires such additional
protection.
KENT

A.

TESS-MATrNER

44. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962).
45. See Note, supra note 32, at 749, cited in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Trans. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 243 n.6, 201 N.W.2d 745, 752 n.6 (1972) (contending that
such punishment has no place in the law of damages for mere negligence).

